Summary:
This paper presents a mixed integer linear programming solution approach for the equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) problem of finding the Nash equilibrium (NE) in strategic bidding in short-term electricity markets. A binary expansion (BE) scheme is used to transform the nonlinear, nonconvex, NE problem into a mixed integer linear problem (MILP), which can be solved by commercially available computational systems. The BE scheme can be applicable to Cournot, Bertrand, or joint price/quantity bidding models. The approach is illustrated in case studies with configurations derived from the 95-GW Brazilian system, including unit-commitment decisions to the price-maker agents.
Keywords: Electricity pool market, game theory, market models, mixed-integer linear programming (MILP), Nash equilibrium (NE).I
JCR Impact Factor and WoS quartile: 0,922 (2006); 6,500 - Q1 (2023)
DOI reference:
https://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2006.873127
Published on paper: May 2006.
Published on-line: May 2006.
Citation:
L.A. Barroso, R. D. Carneiro, S. Granville, M. V. Pereira, M. Fampa, Nash equilibrium in strategic bidding: a binary expansion approach. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. Vol. 21, nº. 2, pp. 629 - 638, May 2006. [Online: May 2006]
